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Abstract Advance directives frequently demand a certain degree of interpretation
by the responsible physician or healthcare team. In implementing
advance directives, healthcare professionals find themselves in an area of
conflict between respect for autonomy, on the one hand, and paternalism
on the other. Legal standards and ethical criteria for assessing the
validity of advance directives are introduced and briefly discussed. The
ethical criteria presented (accuracy of fit, plausibility/authenticity, lack of
contradictions and coherent value system) can serve as important guides
for appropriate and consistent interpretation of advance directives. In
addition, the effect of advance directives on relationships is addressed
from the perspective of the ethics of care.
1Chapter 11
2Advance Directives Between Respect
3for Patient Autonomy and Paternalism
4Manuel Trachsel, Christine Mitchell, and Nikola Biller-Andorno
511.1 Introduction
6There are two main types of advance directives. One type simply designates a
7substitute decision-maker, sometimes called a healthcare agent, proxy or surrogate.
8A more comprehensive advance directive (sometimes called a living will) specifies
9particular principles or considerations intended to guide action with regard to
10specific future healthcare decisions and possible medical conditions (Jaworska
112009).
12At the time an advance directive is composed, the individual anticipates a future
13situation in which s/he (1) will have lost decision-making capacity and (2) will be in
14a condition that requires consent for or refusal of a medical intervention. Currently
15competent individuals can thus make anticipatory decisions for possible future
16healthcare situations.
17The existence of an advance directive does not necessarily mean, however, that
18it will be clear to the responsible physician in every case what the patient would
19have decided. Problems with advance directives include, for instance, vagueness,
20concerns about authenticity, applicability, the competence of the executor, implau-
21sibility, internal contradictions, acceptability, and the suitability of the designated
22surrogate decision-maker, as well as the question whether the anticipatory decisions
23are what the patient would actually want now.
24Notwithstanding these problems, advance directives are increasingly widely
25recognized as a legal instrument: in many countries, including the US and most
M. Trachsel (*) • N. Biller-Andorno
Institute of Biomedical Ethics, University of Zurich, Pestalozzistrasse 24,
CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: AU1manuel.trachsel@gmail.com
C. Mitchell, RN, MS, MTS
Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School, 641 Huntington Avenue,
Boston, MA 02115, USA
e-mail: christine.mitchell@childrens.harvard.edu
P. Lack et al. (eds.), Advance Directives, International Library of Ethics,
Law, and the New Medicine 54, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-7377-6_11,
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
26 Western European states, the wishes expressed in an advance directive have to
27 be respected regardless of the type and stage of disease (Vollmann 2012), unless
28 the directive is legally invalid. However, patients have no claim right—i.e. they
29 have no right to demand particular treatments, especially when these are expected
30 to be futile (see e.g. Engelhardt 1989). Instead, patients have the right to consent to
31 or refuse a particular recommended treatment, since every medical treatment
32 represents an intrusion into a person’s physical and mental integrity and therefore
33 requires consent.
34 In many cases, a more or less broad range of interpretation is needed with regard
35 to the meaning and implementation of an individual’s healthcare decisions made in
36 advance of their illness. This interpretative process is guided by a number of legal
37 standards and ethical criteria, designed to avoid the traps of paternalism and neglect
38 of autonomy.
39 11.2 Between Respect for Autonomy and Paternalism
40 In cases where decision-making incapacity is diagnosed, two situations can be
41 broadly distinguished: either an advance directive is on hand or no written1 advance
42 directive is on hand.
43 11.2.1 Advance Directive on Hand
44 Advance directives are designed to ensure that individual wishes expressed when
45 the person was competent to do so are still respected in the event of decision-
46 making incapacity. Ideally, the wishes formulated in the advance directive are in
47 accordance with the patient’s current best interests. However, the wishes expressed
48 in the advance directive may sometimes be regarded as contrary to the incompetent
49 patient’s well-being.
50 According to Olick (2001), advance directives reflect “critical interests” with
51 regard to personal dignity and well-being. Therefore, they have to be respected even
52 if they conflict with current sensations of pleasure and pain. In this case, respect for
53 autonomy—one of the four bioethical principles advocated by Beauchamp and
54 Childress (2001)—is given more weight than the principle of beneficence. One
1Verbally expressed wishes are often taken into account in exploring the presumed wishes of the
patient. However, they are clearly less authoritative than a properly executed written document. In
the US, medical orders for life-sustaining treatment (MOLST) are treated like advance directives
even though they are not initiated by the patient; they merely record the healthcare provider’s
conversation with the patient in the form of an order kept in the patient’s medical record and
applicable across various healthcare locations, such as hospitals, nursing homes, ambulances,
hospices and the patient’s home.
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55example would be a patient’s wish, expressed in an advance directive, not to receive
56pain medication that could impair consciousness. Now, the patient, suffering from
57end-stage cancer, is in a palliative situation in which only opioids could provide
58significant pain relief. According to the advance directive, the physician is not
59supposed to administer opioids, nomatter how excruciating the patient’s painmay be.
6011.2.2 No Advance Directive on Hand
61For patients who have not prepared an advance directive, treatment decisions are
62made by surrogates such as family members (see e.g. Zellweger et al. 2008). Under
63such circumstances, the principle of beneficence may sometimes be given greater
64weight than respect for autonomy, as in the following case. An otherwise happy
65elderly person with multiple chronic conditions and decision-making incapacity has
66temporary kidney failure that could be reversed with dialysis. The patient does not
67have an advance directive, but when still competent she stated repeatedly to family
68members and medical care providers that she would not wish to be “dependent on
69machines” to continue living. Nevertheless, in this case, the responsible
70physician—having consulted the patient’s relatives, who see this as a temporary
71health crisis in an otherwise stable health situation with an apparently fair quality of
72life—decides to treat the patient’s kidney failure.
73Tensions between respect for autonomy and beneficence frequently arise,
74whether or not a patient has an advance directive. In attempting to resolve such
75tensions, healthcare providers may err on the side of paternalism or on the side of
76unwarranted respect for supposedly autonomous decisions which do not in fact
77reflect competent choices.
7811.2.3 Paternalism
79Paternalism can be defined as “the interference of a state or an individual with
80another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the
81person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm” (Dworkin 2010).
82According to this definition, paternalism always involves a certain degree of
83constraint on a person’s freedom or autonomy for particular reasons. The following
84two examples illustrate paternalistic behaviour:
851. Out of compassion, a forensic physician tells the parents of a victim of violence
86that their daughter died instantly, whereas in fact she suffered a dreadful death.
872. The wife of an alcoholic hides her husband’s liquor bottles because she is
88worried about his health.
89Paternalistic behaviour may be characterized as weak (soft) or strong. According
90to weak paternalism, “a man can rightly be prevented from harming himself
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91 (when other interests are not directly involved) only if his intended action is
92 substantially nonvoluntary or can be presumed to be so in the absence of evidence
93 to the contrary” (Feinberg 1971). Strong paternalism is embraced when a person is
94 protected “against his will, from the harmful consequences even of his fully
95 voluntary choices and undertakings” (Feinberg 1971).
96 An example of weak paternalism is the situation in which a patient specifies in
97 his advance directive a desire to continue taking some sort of complementary
98 medication; his physician, however, discovers that the medication causes signifi-
99 cant harm to the patient, which she presumes the patient was not aware of. As she
100 can no longer discuss this with the patient, who is now incompetent, she overrides
101 the patient’s advance directive, stopping the treatment for the patient’s benefit.
102 An example of strong paternalism is a case where a patient whose valid advance
103 directive clearly states that he refuses hospitalization for any medical reason is
104 hospitalized overnight to receive intravenous hydration for life-threatening
105 dehydration.
106 The motivation for potentially justifiable—weak or strong—paternalism is usu-
107 ally the desire to avoid harm (non-maleficence) and/or to benefit the person whose
108 autonomy is overridden or compromised.
109 One could simply argue that, in sum, paternalistic behaviour probably produces
110 more good than harm. But is this really true? According to Gerald Dworkin (2010),
111 this largely depends on our understanding of the good. If the good simply comprises
112 longer life, better health or relief from pain, paternalism might well be an effective
113 strategy. However, for many people, the good also includes elements such as the
114 right to make self-guided decisions. While paternalism can be considered an
115 acceptable moral stance when autonomy is absent or at least in doubt, overriding
116 an individual’s explicit, autonomous choice for the sake of promoting his or her
117 well-being is difficult to justify morally.
118 11.2.4 Respect for Autonomy
119 Autonomy or self-determination is a person’s ability to make his or her own self-
120 guided decisions. The principle of respect for autonomy obligates healthcare
121 professionals to honour competent patients’ informed, voluntary decisions.
122 According to Ronald Dworkin (1993), a person with the capacity for autonomy
123 needs (1) the ability to espouse a “genuine preference or character or conviction or a
124 sense of self”, which could be called the ability to value, and (2) the ability to act
125 out of one’s sense of conviction, which Jaworska (2009) calls “the ability to enact
126 one’s values in the complex circumstances of the real world”. These crucial abilities
127 are missing in many disorders, such as severe dementia or loss of consciousness.
128 If it is possible to apply a specific advance directive directly to a given situation,
129 a conflict between respect for autonomy and paternalism may not occur. In this
130 case, the expressed wishes can be transformed into action without restriction.
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131However, the conflict becomes relevant if an advance directive is formulated
132vaguely or cannot be directly applied to the present medical situation. In this
133more difficult case, the advance directive can only serve as a decision aid or a
134source for inferring the patient’s presumed wishes. For example, if an advance
135directive contains a detailed statement of treatment preferences for end-stage
136cancer, this statement is not necessarily useful if the patient suffers not from cancer
137but from end-stage liver cirrhosis with hepatic encephalopathy and loss of con-
138sciousness. This example refers to the accuracy of fit that is part of the validity of
139advance directives (see Sect. 11.3).
140But even if choices are clearly expressed and obviously apply to a specific
141situation, the range of choices that need to be respected is not unlimited: for
142example, certain preferences would impose an undue risk or burden on others,
143costly but futile interventions would place an unjustifiable burden on a limited
144public healthcare budget, and refusal of basic hygiene might be intolerable for those
145who care for the patient. The exact scope of what can be claimed or refused is
146controversial. Disagreements over what wishes need to be respected and what one
147person can legitimately ask of another are illustrated by the case of active
148euthanasia.
14911.3 Legal Standards and Ethical Criteria for Assessing
150the Validity of Advance Directives
15111.3.1 Legal Standards
152In most countries, legal standards for a valid advance directive require a written
153form that is personally signed by a person who is of age (legal majority), has
154decision-making capacity, is informed about the decision to be taken (including
155alternatives to the chosen action), and is able to make and communicate a free
156(uncoerced) choice.
157At the time of composing an advance directive, a person is required to have
158decision-making capacity. The following criteria are typically used for medical
159decision-making capacity: (1) ability to understand the relevant information,
160(2) ability to appreciate the medical consequences of the situation, (3) ability to
161reason about treatment choices, and (4) ability to communicate a choice
162(Appelbaum and Grisso 1988). Criteria may differ slightly from country to country,
163but the basic concept is the same (see e.g. Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences
1642005). A variety of instruments aid the assessment of decision-making capacity
165(Sessums et al. 2011).
166Decision-making incapacity is caused by a broad range of clinical conditions,
167such as loss of consciousness due to severe somatic illness, dementia (e.g.
168Alzheimer’s disease or Lewy body disease), brain injury and psychiatric diseases
169(e.g. schizophrenia or severe depression).
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170 It is especially difficult to assess retrospectively whether a patient had decision-
171 making capacity at the time he or she composed an advance directive. Frequently, a
172 patient diagnosed as incompetent to make a particular healthcare decision has an
173 advance directive that was written many years ago. If, for instance, a patient suffers
174 from slow progressive dementia, it can be difficult to establish whether the person
175 was still competent 5 years ago when he or she wrote the advance directive. The
176 ethical criteria presented below can be used to test the moral appropriateness of
177 heeding the contents of an advance directive. In addition, it may be helpful to
178 interview relatives, friends, physicians and other care professionals who have been
179 in contact with the person over a longer period.
180 Free choice means that a person composing an advance directive has to be able
181 to make an autonomous decision and to communicate the choice without feeling
182 threatened, under duress or external pressure. Ideally, the living will originates from
183 a person’s idiosyncratic substrate of wishes and values. According to Beauchamp
184 and Childress (2001), three conditions constitute an autonomous decision: (1) the
185 act was carried out intentionally, (2) the act was carried out with an understanding
186 of the important facts and circumstances and (3) the act was carried out without
187 external “controlling influences”.
188 If these legal standards are not met, the advance directive cannot be used to
189 justify medical decisions. If the legal standards are met, an analysis based on ethical
190 criteria can follow.
191 11.3.2 Ethical Criteria
192 When an advance directive is formulated vaguely or cannot be directly applied to
193 the present medical situation, criteria are needed to judge its ethical validity,
194 helping to prevent unwarranted paternalism or undue respect for autonomy in
195 cases where there was no competent choice. Four main characteristics have been
196 proposed as ethical criteria for assessing the validity of advance directives (see also
197 Trachsel et al. forthcoming):
198 1. accuracy of fit
199 2. plausibility/authenticity
200 3. lack of contradictions
201 4. coherent value system
202 Accuracy of fit means that the clinical situation in question corresponds to the
203 situation envisaged in the advance directive. This does not necessarily imply that
204 advance directives have to be overly specific, as it may be difficult or impossible for
205 the patient to fully anticipate the details of their diagnoses and prognoses, and to
206 make an informed choice based on an appreciation of the options available.
207 However, it is certainly helpful for the patient, family members and the health
208 professionals concerned if the patient’s preferences and values are clearly stated, as
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209well as any particular wishes about interventions such as blood transfusions or
210mechanical life support in the form of ventilators, artificial hearts, etc.
211An advance directive is plausible and authentic when it is in accordance with
212one’s distinctive wishes, personality, character and lifestyle. For relatives and
213physicians who know the patient, an advance directive will be easiest to accept as
214representative of the patient’s wishes when the content is consonant with his or her
215personal traits.
216The concept of authenticity has been extensively debated (e.g. Golomb 1995;
217Wood et al. 2008). According to a widely shared position (Frankfurt 1988; Glannon
2182008), persons are authentic if they can identify with their mental states. For
219example, wishes expressed with regard to pain medication are authentic if they
220are formulated by a person who has suffered from chronic pain (mental state) for
221years, and if the person is able to attest through her or his higher-order reflective
222capacity that this chronic pain is relevant to the wishes specified in the advance
223directive.
224However, authenticity is not a legal requirement for the validity of advance
225directives, and it is contentious as an ethical criterion (Brauer 2008). Legally, a
226person is free to refuse a certain treatment regardless of his or her reasons and even
227in the absence of particular reasons. Accordingly, Olick (2001) states that an
228advance directive is not required to be an authentic expression of its author. The
229requirement of authenticity would open the floodgates to paternalistic actions, as it
230would be quite easy to evaluate an advance directive as non-authentic and
231non-autonomous. Instead, it is sufficient to see an advance directive as an “inten-
232tional plan to assert control over one’s dying process” (Olick 2001).
233It seems self-evident that an advance directive should not contain internal
234contradictions or contradictory instructions with regard to one and the same
235medical situation. For instance, a patient’s living will cannot be honoured when
236one part of the advance directive refuses withdrawal of treatment in every imagin-
237able situation and requests that everything possible be done to obtain a lung
238transplant, while another part of the same advance directive requests withdrawal
239of treatment in end-stage cystic fibrosis.
240The ethical validity of an advance directive is more obvious when the wishes
241expressed are evidently based on a coherent value system. This can be defined as a
242set of values that are interconnected in a logical and hierarchical manner and that
243guide a person’s preferences, decisions and actions. The value system need not be
244highly complex and abstract, nor does the absence of an identifiable coherent value
245system render an advance directive invalid. In fact, it is controversial whether and
246how ethical values should be communicated to healthcare professionals and
247relatives via an advance directive at all (Brauer 2008).
248The ethical criteria described above can provide important guidance in assessing
249the validity of advance directives that are, for instance, formulated vaguely or
250cannot be directly applied to the clinical situation (see also Trachsel
251et al. forthcoming). However, it is important to discuss the precise role of these
252criteria in the assessment. Some, such as accuracy of fit and lack of contradiction,
253are fairly uncontroversial as a matter of principle but may be applied more or
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254 less strictly. Others, such as authenticity and a coherent value system, remain
255 controversial as regards both interpretation and appropriateness. Even so, they
256 capture important aspects of the debate on advance directives and can help to
257 articulate the reasons for moral disagreement.
258 The criteria discussed in this section focus on the choices expressed by a rational
259 individual moral agent. However, the situations advance directives aim to antici-
260 pate are likely to be characterized to a great extent by dependence on others. It is
261 thus of interest to explore what a relational perspective can add to the discussion on
262 advance directives.
263 11.4 Advance Directives and Relationships: The Ethics
264 of Care Perspective
265 The fundamental conflict between respect for autonomy and paternalism is part of
266 every social relationship. Alongside other ethical approaches, the ethics of care
267 (Held 2005) provides an important theoretical perspective on this conflict.
268 The ethics of care is a form of relational ethics in the sense that “its central focus
269 is on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the
270 particular others for whom we take responsibility” (Held 2005). The ethics of care
271 respects the fact that persons depend on others for most of their lives. The ethics of
272 care “addresses rather than neglects moral issues arising in relations among the
273 unequal and dependent, relations that are often emotion-laden and involuntary”
274 (Held 2005). The family context is prototypical for such relations.
275 Degrees of dependence may vary over the life course; for instance, children or
276 persons in situations of illness or after accidents will need a lot of care. But even
277 healthy adults are likely not to be completely self-sufficient, but need others even
278 for their everyday professional and private activities. Later in life, many people
279 need care every day, and some individuals with disabilities may be dependent on
280 care throughout their lives.
281 Most people composing an advance directive do so with a view to a future
282 situation of involuntary dependence in which they need the care of others. Focusing
283 on individual preferences and trying to extend individual autonomy may not do
284 justice to the challenges posed by this new state of significant need and dependence.
285 On the other hand, advance directives are not necessarily antithetical to a care
286 perspective. The ethics of care does not postulate that there is no room for private
287 decisions that may also go against the expectations or wishes of close persons.
288 Advance directives can specify the relational network in which the individual is
289 situated and highlight trustful relationships. Also, advance directives need not be a
290 vote of no confidence in the treating physicians or caring relatives; they may even
291 serve as an “icebreaker”, making it easier for healthcare professionals and relatives
292 to communicate about the patient’s preferences and interests. Not surprisingly,
293 a randomized controlled study found that advance care planning including the
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294formulation of an advance directive “improves end of life care and patient and
295family satisfaction and reduces stress, anxiety, and depression in surviving
296relatives” (Detering et al. 2010).
297Furthermore, the ethics of care values sympathy, antipathy, anger, respon-
298siveness or other feelings as important moral emotions that should guide behaviour
299no less than rational arguments. This puts a new complexion on the conflict between
300respect for autonomy and paternalism. Even if an advance directive is not fully
301consistent and rational, this does not mean that it is completely irrelevant and that
302the only option is to override it in a paternalistic manner. Instead, it is advisable to
303place more reliance on the emotions expressed in the document, which can provide
304an important basis for discussing the implementation of an advance directive.
30511.5 Consistency in the Implementation
306of Advance Directives
307Ethical criteria for assessing validity need to be calibrated in such a way as to strike
308a balance between paternalism and a form of consumerism that would let patients
309have their way even if their advance directive is not an expression of a competent
310choice. Even though some of the requirements (e.g. for a coherent value system)
311may be controversial, measuring individual advance directives against these ethical
312criteria can help to promote consistent implementation among physicians and
313healthcare teams. Beyond individual judgements, the ethical criteria also provide
314a framework for discussing consistent implementation of advance directives within
315medical communities (e.g. groups of providers or medical subdisciplines).
316The requirement for consistency is fairly straightforward: if two similar patients
317with similar health problems compose similar advance directives, the patients
318should be treated similarly. If the two patients, their health problems or their
319advance directives differ in essential respects, it is perhaps not appropriate to
320treat the two patients similarly. Yet this claim raises a lot of questions. Should
321patients with decision-making incapacity who have the same disease (e.g. end-stage
322brain cancer) and a very similar advance directive be treated similarly, even if
323one patient is 30 and the other 90 years old? Perhaps both have stated in their
324advance directive that they do not wish to receive further surgical treatment for their
325cancer once they become incapable of decision-making. Intuitively, one may be
326more inclined to accept this living will if the patient is 90 because of the whole life
327span we could imagine ahead of the 30-year-old patient. Yet this would constitute an
328age bias that is not part of the advance directive concept. An advance directive is
329valid regardless of the patient’s age. For instance, even a child of 10 years can have
330decision-making capacity with regard to some vitally important decisions.
331There may be other sources of potential bias: physicians may be more inclined to
332implement an advance directive if they agree with the wishes expressed by the patient.
333Thresholds for the validity of an advance directive might be raised when physicians
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334 completely disagree with the content of an advance directive, particularly with regard
335 to morally highly charged issues such as assisted suicide. Economic factors might
336 also influence the acceptance of an advance directive. Relatives might, for instance,
337 not want to let go of their loved one and argue for a very strict interpretation of
338 standards; conversely, theymight beworried about the costs accumulating for the care
339 of their relative, whose quality of life they consider to be very poor. The requirement
340 of consistency calls for a given advance directive to be interpreted in the same way
341 regardless of biasing factors.
342 11.6 Conclusions
343 In cases where decision-making incapacity is diagnosed, the existence of an advance
344 directive does not necessarily mean that it will be clear to the responsible physician
345 in every case what the patient would have decided. Problemswith advance directives
346 include vagueness, the question of authenticity, applicability, the competence of the
347 executor, implausibility, internal contradictions, acceptability, or the question
348 whether the anticipatory decisions are what the patient would actually want now.
349 Because advance directives are not always clearly formulated, a certain degree
350 of interpretation is demanded of the responsible physician. In interpreting advance
351 directives, healthcare professionals find themselves in an area of conflict between
352 respect for autonomy, on the one hand, and paternalism on the other.
353 Besides legal requirements, it is important to apply ethical criteria—including
354 accuracy of fit, plausibility/authenticity, lack of contradictions and a coherent value
355 system—for assessing the validity of advance directives, although there is certainly
356 room for discussion as to the specific requirements which these criteria should entail.
357 The fundamental conflict between respect for autonomy and paternalism is part
358 of every social relationship. Alongside other ethical approaches, the ethics of care
359 (Held 2005, 2006) provides an important theoretical perspective on this conflict.
360 Advance directives are composed for a future situation of involuntary dependence,
361 in which someone needs the care of others. Advance directives are not a vote of no
362 confidence and could even ease the burden on close relationships, serving as critical
363 icebreakers for communication between patients, relatives and healthcare profes-
364 sionals regarding the care patients receive when they are no longer able to speak
365 for themselves.
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